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the accident. The claims were filed too late and were therefore rejected.
The Shelbys and Tripp then obtained the appointment of an ancillary ad-
ministrator in Vinton County. The only clamn of property in that county
arose from the fact that Wilcox had liability insurance and that the in-
surance company, of Washington, D. C., was obligated to defend the de-
cedent in case an action was brought against him in Vinton County, and
to indemnify him in the event of a judgment against him. In holding
that the motion to dissolve the ancillary administration should have been
granted, the court made short work of the above argument. The Shelbys
and Tripp, said the court, did not bring an action in Vinton County while
Wilcox was alive, and they could not do so after his death because the
provisions for substituted service against a nonresident motorist do not
extend to the personal representative of a deceased nonresident Thus,
the insurance company had no obligation to Wilcox in Vinton County,
and he cannot be said to have died leaving property there.
FLETcimm R. ANREs
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional litigation in 1956 emphasized the adjustments of
property rights - zoning, licensing, vested rights - as well as pro-
cedural due process issues.
That zoning cases proved exceptionally active was reflected dn one
judge's opinion by the words:
Not in the history of our nation has there been a decade equal to
the last decade in expansion of travel, industry and common interests
or in the decentralization of -what theretofore had seemed to be cen-
trally and permanently fixed in the core of metropolitan centers. Public
officials must recogize these movements and courts, in passing judgment
on the conduct of such officials, must be permitted, to some extent,
to take judicial notice of them.'
Individual zoning problems presented difficulty in balancing between
the police power of public health, safety, morals and general welfare and
the property rights of land owners. An attempt to extend a residential
district to include commercial property of long standing was held invalid
when 93% of the land value of the commercial property lay in under-
lying minerals, while topography and surrounding circumstances made
residential use exceedingly doubtful.2 Zoning ordinances were held valid,
'Partan v. Brooklyn, 138 N.X.2d 180, 185 (Ohio C.P. 1955) (Blythin, J.)
'Cleveland Builders Supply Co. v. Garfield Heights, 136 N.B.2d 105 (Ohio App.
1956).
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however, ,in two similar situations: changing from retail business to
multifamily dwellings where vacant land was involved (but unconstita-
tional as to 'business establishment already present),a and from dwelling
house classification to industrial use where the parcel contained 61 acres
adjoining a railroad with residences on only one side and the neighbor-
hood rapidly changing in character.4
Two zoning ordinances sought absolute prohibitions of land use:
one prohibited trailer or cabin camps in a -township; the other banned
churches or temples in a single family residential district. The former
was held constitutional; 5 the latter unconstitutional. 6 Undoubtedly the
invalidity of the latter was influenced by the fact that the single family
residential district classification also permitted farms, nursery, truck
gardens or non-commercial greenhouses under the ordinance. If the
zoning use allows for caring of the soil it must also grant the right to
care for the soul.
The power to license is an effective control of use of property. To
require a license to conduct a "distress merchandise sale' or "going out
of business sale" was held not per se unreasonable or unconstitutional.7
To file an application for a liquor permit grants no vested right to -the
permit, and thus a subsequent "freeze" on the issuance of permits does
not affect the license seeker unconstitutionally 5 To suspend a driver's
license after the licensee was adjudged bankrupt and failed to pay an un-
satisfied judgment arising out of the accident which led to the license
suspension is constitutional.9 This action does not supersede the Federal
Bankruptcy Act; neither does it contravene the fourteenth amendment
nor any Ohio constitutional provision.
No invalidity attached to the inheritance statute which prescribed that
adopted children shall be treated as natural children and shall cease to
be treated as the children of the natural parents for intestate succession,
even when applied to children adopted prior to the statutes enactment.
No vested right to inheritance existed until the death of the estate owner
which followed the enactment."6
'Curtiss v. Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio App. 1955)
'Partain v. Brooklyn, 138 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
'Davis v. McPherson, 132 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio App. 1955), appeal dismsssed, 164
Ohio St. 296, 130 N.E.2d 342 (1955) and 164 Ohio St. 375, 130 N.E.2d 794
(1955).
'Young Israel Orgamzauon v. Dworkin, 133 N.E.2d 174 (Ohio App. 1956)
'Foltzer v. Cincinnati, 100 Ohio App. 546, 137 N.E.2d 523 (1956)
'Scharff v. Board of Liquor Control, 99 Ohio App. 139, 131 N.E.2d 844 (1955)
'Smith v. Hayes, 133 N.E.2d 443 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
"I re Millward's Estate, 136 N.E.2d 649 (Ohio App. 1956), construing Orno
REv. CODE § 3107.13.
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The major case in the procedural due process area, State v. Morgan,"1
found the Supreme Court divided 4-3. The Ohio Un-American Activi-
ties Committee conducted hearings into subversive activities. Statutory
immunity for statements made was granted to all witnesses by Ohio. The
majority construed Mrs. Morgan's refusal to answer as the proper basis
for criminal action. In doing so the majority concluded that the Com-
mission was a committee of the General Assembly, that the -refusal to
testify can be determined by language which the Commission might
reasonably understand as an attempt to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination, that the witness can be required to answer under
criminal penalty where an immunity statute protects him from Ohio
prosecution although not from federal prosecution, and that the Com-
mission need not direct the witness to answer before criminal liability
attaches. One dissenting judge contended that the witness could claim
the fifth amendment privilege of the Federal Constitution. The second
dissenter pointed out that on the Commission's record the chairman had
directed Mrs. Morgan that she could exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination which she proceeded to do, and furthermore she was never
directed to answer under pain of criminal penalty. The final dissenter
concluded that the Commission was not a General Assembly committee,
so the immunity statute was not applicable and the witness could exercise
her privilege against self-incrimination.
Two civil service cases presented invalid procedural items violating
due process. To hold a mass hearing of 17 police officers of different
ranks before the Civil Service Commission, where no conspiracy or joint
acts were charged but merely gross neglect of duty, denied due process.12
Also it violated due process to remove a police officer charged with con-
duct unbecoming an officer when the accused employee received no copy
of the order and reasons for removal.'2
Other procedural due process issues are found in several decisions.
A -business purchaser has the duty to determine if the seller owes accrued
sales tax and to withhold such sum from the purchase price. Failure to
receive notice of the assessment hearing or to be made a party to the
hearing does not violate due process. 14 A dissenting minority of three
Supreme Court judges would require the state to proceed against the pur-
chaser and directly submit evidence as to the tax due in a full prosecution,
rather than merely apply the assessment determined against .the seller.
t 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956). Appeal is -now pending in the United
States Supreme Court.
Zimmerman v. Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio App. 1955).
'Owens v. Ackerman, 136 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio App. 1955).
' State v. Sloan, 164 Ohio St. 579, 132 N.E. 2d 460 (1956).
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Another notice requirement - that in cases of voluntary dissolution
notice must be given to all directors of a corporation and such other per-
sons as the court deems proper - was held not to violate procedural due
process.' 5  All statutory procedural steps were held to be required in
appropriation of land for highway purposes by the Director of High-
ways, otherwise the landowners would be deprived of property without
due process of law.' 6
Interesting but not unusual due process cases determined: that the
term "moral turpitude" was not unconstitutionally vague in a disbarment
statute;17 and that a justice of the peace was disqualified from trying a
person where the justice's income was dependent on the costs assessed
only upon conviction, and the same conviction also violated due process
where no evidence was heard.'8
Four other constitutional cases in 1956 should be -noted. In Fletcher v.
Coney Island,'9 a Negro sought to enjoin a private amusement park
operator from practicing racial discrimination in admission of customers.
The majority of the court denied the remedy, concluding that the General
Assembly had not contemplated injunctive relief under the Ohio Civil
Rights Act, only criminal prosecution and civil penalty. In the absence
of statutory authority, the majority relied on common law which permits
private places of amusement to discriminate racially in admitting cus-
tomers. The -two dissenting judges contended that the decision failed to
protect the plaintiff's civil rights. To interpret the statute as narrowly
as did the majority would permit a person to violate the Civil Rights
Act with only the mere chance of criminal prosecution or civil penalty
attaching.
Nudists, seeking to file non-profit incorporation articles, can be con-
stitutionally denied this right for the obscenity statute prohibiting two or
more persons of -the opposite sex over 18 years old from exposing private
parts is a valid exercise of the police power, regardless of the belief of
those desiring to practice nudism as a doctrine of life, cult or sect.20
The Supreme Court also held valid against -the challenge of retroactive
legislation an amendment requiring that no person be eligible for nomina-
'Hollywood Television Service v. Picture Waves, 136 N.E.2d 617 (Ohio App.
1954)
"In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 99 Ohio App. 251, 132
N.E.2d 247 (1954).
"In re Prentice, 132 N.E.2d 634 (Ohio App. 1953) This case is also discussed in
the ATroNYs section, supra.
"ln re Tullius, 137 N.E.2d 312 (Ohio Prob. 1955)
" 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956). This decision is also discussed in the
EQUITY section, mfra.
'State cx rel. Church v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 31, 133 N.E.2d 333 (1956).
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